中国、若开军和缅甸的解决方案

         原创 观察员 印太局势观察 

译自《缅甸前沿阵地》(frontiermyanmar)

作者：孙韵（Yun Sun）

    若开军新兵在靠近中国边境的克钦邦拉咱的该组织总部接受训练。昆腊（Hkun Lat）|《前沿缅甸》

    若开邦民众对若开军（AA）的支持改变了那里的冲突规则，这也是这个少数民族武装组织越来越不受中国压力影响的原因之一。若开军的出现给停滞不前的和平进程，以及缅甸为结束几十年冲突所作的努力造成了最严重的问题。

    自2019年1月以来，若开军和缅军（Tatmadaw）在若开邦和钦邦之间的激烈军事冲突不仅造成了不稳定、不安全和人员的伤亡。激烈的冲突还卷走了利益攸关者本来可以用于谈判和政治对话的所有兴趣和资源。

    涉及若开军有关的冲突使今年的全国大选更加复杂化，并阻碍了选举在一些基层层面的投票。冲突还阻碍了解决罗兴亚危机的进展，因为将难民遣返到冲突地区既不可取也不可行。

基本问题

关于若开军最普遍的问题是：中国何时会出手阻止若开军?

    这是一个具有一定合理性的问题，因为若开军的存在一直和与中国关系密切的组织有着密切的关系。若开军是在位于中缅边境拉咱（Laiza）的克钦独立军（KIA）总部那里创建成立的，其发展得到了克钦独立军推动，以及佤邦联合军（UWSA）的支持。这是缅中边境地区最大、最强的两个少数民族武装组织。克钦独立军和佤邦联合军都受到中国的影响，也可以说是受制于中国（尽管程度不同）。

     在政治上，若开军是联邦政治谈判协商委员会（FPNCC）的成员。联邦政治谈判协商委员会由缅北的7家少数民族武装组织组成，由佤邦联合军领导。在军事上，若开军是北方联盟（NA）的成员，北方联盟还包括克钦独立军、德昂民族解放军（TNLA）和缅甸民族民主同盟军（MNDAA）。

    关于中国可以阻止若开军袭击的争论集中在一个基本推理上，即由于若开军是中国的代理人（特别是佤邦联合军）的代理人，中国有明确的能力直接或间接地通过佤邦联合军将自己的意志强加于若开军。即使若开军并不完全依赖佤邦联合军和克钦独立军提供资金，因为若开军已经建立了独立的收入来源，比如武器和贩毒（译者注：证据？缅军和缅政府都没敢这样指控）。但佤邦联合军仍被认为通过武器供应对若开军具有决定性的影响力。因此，逻辑很简单：如果中国想要终止若开军的作战能力，就可以告诉佤邦联合军停止向若开军提供武器。

次要问题

     因此，一个显而易见的问题是：为什么中国没有阻止若开军和若开邦的军事冲突?

    这是一个合理的问题。若开军的袭击并不符合中国的利益。除了中国对军事冲突和不稳定的总的反感之外，若开军的军事行动也给中国带来了真正的问题。若开军在若开邦作战，又与北方联盟的盟军参与了在掸邦北部和曼德勒省的攻势。曼德勒省是中国从西南省份云南进入印度洋的战略走廊。

    除了破坏中国在该地区的基础设施项目的投资环境外，战斗还扰乱了连接曼德勒和边境贸易城镇木姐(Muse)的主干公路的交通。这条主干公路是双边贸易最重要的大动脉，也是最容易受到攻击的通道。去年8月，在若开军、德昂民族解放军和缅甸民族民主同盟军对位于彬乌伦（Pyin Oo Lwin）的国防技术学院以及邻近掸邦的警察哨所和其他目标发动联合袭击后，这条主干公路关闭了数天。

    若开军会停战吗?

    据报道，在去年8月的袭击事件后，中国明确表达了自己的担忧，并向若开军施压，但无济于事。事实上，越来越多的证据表明，中国控制若开军的能力有限。原因之一就是佤邦联合军并不完全受制于中国，他们可以在自己的领土内出售防空武器。佤邦联合军在自己的领土内拥有很大的自治权。另一个原因是佤邦联合军在向若开军提供武器方面并没有垄断性地位。只要若开军有财力，它就完全可以在黑市上购买武器，包括从其他国家购买。

    尽管在早期实力弱小，但随着若开军的战斗力不断增强，战场上的成功和对领土的逐步占领，已经使若开军不可战胜。它的经济实力也变得雄厚，从贩毒和其他非法活动中获得了大量的财政资源，还有来自缅甸国内外支持者的捐款。若开军的经济和政治吸引力，使其能够招募越来越多的士兵。若开军已经不再是一个为生存而斗争的弱小的民族武装组织。

    若开军崛起的最重要因素之一，是其在若开邦人民中的声望稳步提高，他们是若开军的合法性、实力和可持续性发展的根本来源。若开邦人民对他们认为剥夺其政治权利的情况感到失望，并对民主进程感到失望。

   在2015年11月的大选中，虽然若开民族党（ANP）47名成员赢得了35个选区中的22个席位。尽管在若开邦致获得9席，但以缅族人为主的全民盟（NLD）根据宪法行使了自己的权利，任命自己的人担任了若开邦首席部长。

若开邦人也对去年3月前若开民族党领导人埃貌（Aye Maung）博士因叛国罪被判20年监禁感到不满。据报道，埃貌博士在一次演讲中指责全民盟将若开邦人当作“奴隶”对待。长期的监禁消除了通过谈判解决若开民族和解的任何希望。

这种政治上的不满增加了对若开军的支持，与此同时，若开军正在成长为一股更强大的力量。人民对若开军的支持从根本上改变了若开邦的游戏规则。若开军不再依靠大型组织的赞助。相反，若开军作为若开邦人民代表的地位正在获得合法性，若开族人占了该邦人口的大多数，比克钦邦克钦族人的比例都要高得多。若开军得以持续不断地发展和坚韧性，最重要的原因是得到占全邦绝大部分人民的支持。

民众对若开军的支持极大地影响了中国对若开军的态度。作为“人民战争”的缔造者和推动者，中国共产党对民意支持的力量和重要性有着深刻的认识。若开军在若开邦不断增长拥护者和支持率，这意味着在这个邦拥有重要经济利益的中国，不会以疏远该邦大多数人民的风险来对抗若开军，即使这意味着中国必须在短期内承担因为若开军的袭击所增加的成本。

根本问题

尽管缅甸政府和缅军有否定若开军的合法性和不承认的愿望和理由，但他们将不得不面对这样一个现实：该组织的政治合法性和军事坚韧性已经超出了他们的控制。

   如果无法取得决定性的军事胜利，唯一的其他选择就是通过对话和谈判找到政治解决办法。这是否会发生在一场旷日持久的消耗战之后，是缅甸自己的选择。但如果要让中国为若开邦的局势负责，就不太可能找出解决方案，因为若开军挑起战争的能力并不取决于中国。

解决冲突最终需要缅甸的解决方案

     China, the Arakan Army, a Myanmar solution



    Arakan Army recruits train at the group's headquarters in Laiza, Kachin State, near the Chinese border. (Hkun Lat | Frontier)

     Monday, March 23, 2020

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    Popular support in Rakhine State for the Arakan Army has been a game changer for the conflict there is one reason why the ethnic armed group is increasingly impervious to pressure from China.

By YUN SUN | FRONTIER

    The emergence of the Arakan Army has created the most acute problem for the stalled peace process Myanmar’s efforts to end decades of conflict.

    The severe fighting between the AA Tatmadaw in Rakhine Chin States since January 2019 has not only caused instability, insecurity casualties. It has also sucked up all the attention resources that stakeholders could otherwise have devoted to negotiations political dialogue.

    The conflict involving the AA is complicating this year’s general elections at the national level hindering voting at the local level. The fighting is also obstructing progress in addressing the Rohingya crisis because repatriating refugees to conflict zones is neither desirable nor feasible.

      The basic question

    The prevailing question about the AA is this: when will China intervene to stop the AA?

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It’s a question with some legitimacy because the AA’s existence has been closely linked to groups with strong ties to China. The AA was created by the Kachin Independence Army at its headquarters at Laiza, on the Myanmar-China border, its development has been fostered by the KIA more recently the United Wa State Army. These are the two biggest strongest ethnic armed organisations based along Myanmar’s border with China. The KIA UWSA are subject to China’s influence arguably, to China’s preferences (although to different degrees).

Politically, the AA is a member of the Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Committee, a grouping of seven EAOs in northern Myanmar headed by the UWSA. Militarily, the AA is a member of the Northern Alliance, which includes the KIA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army.

The argument that China could stop the AA’s attacks is centred on the basic inference that because the AA is the proxy of China’s proxies (especially the UWSA), China has the unequivocal ability to impose its preference either directly on the AA or indirectly through the UWSA. Even if the AA does not completely rely on the UWSA KIA for funding, because it has established independent revenue sources such as weapons drug trafficking, the UWSA is assumed to possess a determining influence over the AA through the supply of arms. The logic is therefore simple: if China wants to shut down the AA’s ability to fight, it could tell the UWSA to stop supplying it with weapons.

The secondary question

   An obvious question therefore arises: why has China not stopped the AA the fighting in Rakhine State?

    It’s a reasonable question. The attacks by the AA are not in China’s interest. Aside from China’s general distaste for conflict instability, the AA’s military operations are creating real problems for China. The AA is fighting across Rakhine State with its Northern Alliance partners has been involved in offensives in northern Shan State in Mandalay Region, a strategic corridor through which China accesses the Indian Ocean from its southwestern Yunnan Province.

   Other than damaging the investment environment for China’s infrastructure projects in the region, the fighting has disrupted traffic on the main highway linking Mandalay with the border trade town of Muse. The highway is the most important artery for bilateral trade is the thoroughfare most vulnerable to attack. Last August, after the coordinated attacks by the AA, TNLA MNDAA on the Defence Services Technological Academy in Pyin Oo Lwin on police posts other targets in neighbouring Shan State, the highway was closed for days.

Is the AA stoppable?

   After the August attacks, China reportedly articulated its concerns exerted pressure on the AA, but to no avail. In fact, there is growing evidence that China’s ability to control the AA is limited. One reason is that the UWSA is not entirely subject to pressure from China can sell the AA weapons made within its territory, which it controls with great autonomy. Another reason is that the UWSA does not have a monopoly on the supply of weapons to the AA. As long as the AA has the financial capacity, it can buy weapons on the black market, including from other countries.

   Despite early weaknesses, the AA’s growing capability, battlefield successes gradual acquisition of territory has made it ineliminable. It is economically strong, with significant financial resources acquired from trafficking other illegal activities, as well as donations from its supporters inside outside Myanmar. The economic political appeal of the AA has enabled it to recruit increasing numbers of troops. It is no longer a small, weak ethnic armed group struggling for survival.

    One of the most important factors in the rise of the AA has been its steadily increasing popularity among the Rakhine people, who are the fundamental source of its legitimacy, strength sustainability. The Rakhine people are disappointed by what they regard as the denial of their political rights are disillusioned by the democratic process.

   Although the Arakan National Party won 22 of the 35 elected seats in the 47-member Rakhine Hluttaw in the general election in November 2015, the Bamar-dominated National League for Democracy exercised its right under the constitution to appoint one of its own as chief minister, despite winning only nine state hluttaw seats.

   There is also bitterness among the Rakhine over the sentencing in March last year of former ANP leader Dr Aye Maung to 20 years’ imprisonment for high treason over a speech in which he reportedly accused the NLD of treating the Rakhine people like “slaves”.  The long prison term eliminated any hope of a negotiated solution to ethnic reconciliation in Rakhine.

   This political disaffection has increased support for the AA, which at the same time was emerging as a more powerful force. The people’s support for the AA has fundamentally changed the game. The AA no longer lives off the patronage of larger groups. Instead, it is gaining legitimacy as the representative of the Rakhine people, who comprise the majority of  the state’s population – a much higher percentage than the number of Kachin in Kachin State. The support of the people who comprise most of the state’s population is the most important reason for the sustainability tenacity of the AA.

   The popular support has significantly influenced China’s attitude towards the AA. As the creator promoter of “people’s war”, the Communist Party of China is deeply sensitive to the power importance of popular support. The AA’s growing constituency support in Rakhine dictates that China will not antagonise it at the risk of alienating the majority population of a state in which it has important economic interests, even if that means China has to bear the costs of the AA’s attacks in the short term.

The fundamental question

    Despite their desire rationale to deny the AA legitimacy recognition, the Myanmar government the Tatmadaw will have to grapple with the reality that the group’s political legitimacy military tenacity have grown beyond their control.

    If a decisive military victory is not attainable, the only other option is a political solution involving dialogue negotiations. Whether that happens after a prolonged war of attrition is Myanmar’s choice. But holding China responsible for the situation in Rakhine is unlikely to bring about a solution, because the AA’s ability to wage war does not depend on China.

   A resolution to the conflict will eventually need a Myanmar solution.